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Game Theory in Management Accounting

Implementing Incentives and Fairness

Paperback Engels 2018 9783319871196
Verwachte levertijd ongeveer 9 werkdagen

Samenvatting

This book demonstrates what kind of problems, originating in a management accounting setting, may be solved with game theoretic models. Game theory has experienced growing interest and numerous applications in the field of management accounting. The main focus traditionally has been on the field of non-cooperative behaviour, but the area of cooperative game theory has developed rapidly and has received increasing attention. Intensive research, in combination with the changing culture of publishing, has produced a nearly unmanageable number of publications in the areas concerned. Therefore, one main purpose of this volume is providing an intensive analysis of the intersection of these areas. In addition, the book strengthens the relationship between the theory and the practical applications and it illustrates the two-sided relationship between game theory and management accounting: new game theoretic models offer new fields of applications and these applications raise new questions for the theory.

Specificaties

ISBN13:9783319871196
Taal:Engels
Bindwijze:paperback
Uitgever:Springer International Publishing

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<p>Contents</p> <p>Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>Non-cooperativeModels: Designing Incentives</p> <p>1 Jennifer Kunz:</p> <p>Reflections on the Practical Applicability of Strategic Game Theory</p> <p>to Managerial Incentivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>2 Christian Lukas:</p> <p>Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts: Behavioural and</p> <p>Multi-Period PerformanceMeasurement Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>3 ClemensLöffler:</p> <p>Transfer Prices for Coordination under Decentralized Decision</p> <p>Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</p> <p>4 Hans-Ulrich Küpper, Kai Sandner:</p> <p>Differences in Social Preferences: Are They Profitable for the Firm? </p> <p>5 Günter Bamberg, Michael Krapp:</p> <p>Managerial Compensa</p>tion, Investment Decisions, and Truthfully<p></p> <p>Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>Non-cooperativeModels: Revealing the True Preferences</p> <p>6 Max Patzenhauer:</p> <p>Applications and Potentials of Auction Theory in Management</p> <p>Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</p> <p>7 Benno Woskowski:</p> <p>The Use of Auction in Nurse Rostering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>CooperativeModels: Analysing the Notion of Fairness</p> <p>8 Stephan Zelewski:</p> <p>Fair Distribution of Cooperation Gains in Supply Chains – A</p> <p>Justification Program from an Economic Point of View . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>9 Holger I. Meinhardt</p> <p>The Pre-Kernel as a Fair Division Rule for some Cooperative Game</p> <p>Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p>. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <p></p> <p>10 Juan D. Moreno-Ternero:</p> <p>A Talmudic Approach to Bankruptcy Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</p> <p>Preface xiii</p> 11 Jens Leth Hougaard:<p></p> <p>Sharing the Costs of Access to a Set of Public Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>12 Javier Arin, Ilya Katsev:</p> <p>The SD-prenucleolus for TU-Games: Coalitional Monotonicity and</p> <p>Core Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</p> <p>Cooperative Models: Applications and Specifications</p> <p>13 José M. Gallardo, Nieves Jiménez, Andrés Jiménez-Losada:</p> <p>A Shapley Value for Games with Authorization Structure . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>14 Gerhard Aust, Dora Dominko, Udo Buscher:</p> <p>Interorganizational Resource Sharing in Research and</p> <p>Development Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</p> <p>15 Al</p>ejandro Saavedra-Nieves, Ignacio García-Jurado, M. Gloria<p></p> <p>Fiestras-Janeiro:</p> <p>Placing Joint Orders when Holding Costs are Negligible and</p> <p>Shortages are not Allowed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</p> <p>16 Ana Meca, J. Carlos Varela-Peña:</p> <p>Corporation Tax Games: An Application of Linear Cost Games to</p> <p>Managerial Cost Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>17 Stephan Zelewski, Tatjana Heeb:</p> <p>Characteristics of the τ -value and the χ -value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>18 David Mueller:</p> <p>The Usability and Validity of Allocation Schemes for Corporate</p> <p>Cost Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>Contributing Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</p> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <p></p> <p>List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . </p> <p>List of Journal Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  </p><p> </p>

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